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THE 'RESTATEMENT AND THE KENTUCKY DECISIONS
AS APPLIED TO CONSIDERATION IN CONTRACTS
Now that the American Law Institute has made very deftnite progress in the restatement of the law in several fields, and
has published. an official draft of about one-half of the topics
embraced in the subject of contracts, much interest has developed in the different jurisdictions to discover the extent to which
the local law agrees with the Restatement. This paper is the
frst of a series of studies of the Restatement with special reference to Kentucky law, to be made by members of the law school
faculty of the University of Kentucky.* It is hoped that after the
Kentucky State Bar Association has had an opportunity to act.
upon the matter, a committee of the Bar may cooperate in these
efforts. This study deals with Consideration in Contracts, and
with Sections 75-94 only of the official draft of the Restatement.
It is believed that the Restatement is the most careful work
and the most authoritative declaration of the existing law that
has ever been attempted since the work of Justinian. As has
been suggested by Professor Goodrich,' coult will be glad to
look to it for guidance, but they may be faced with a two-fold
difficulty in that (a) the statute of the jurisdiction may lay down
a rule different from that declared in the Restatement, or (b)
the local decisions may be in conflict with the Restatement. As
no statutes have been enacted in Kentucky affecting the subject
of consideration as an element in contracts, it becomes of primary importance to discover how the eases stand.
The most significant thing, perhaps, is the extent of agreement between the Restatement and the Kentucky decisions. The
writer does not claim to have examined all the Kentucky cases
on consideration in the brief time that has elapsed since he began
this study, but he believes that most of the significant cases have
been examined.
In making the comparison in this limited field one readily
finds three types of situations: (a) those cases that entirely agree
with the Restatement, which are in the great majority; (b) the
*See a brief preliminary discussion of Section 84 (d) by Professor
Charles Rice McDonald in 16 Kentucky Law Journal 306 (1928).
'A. B. A. Journal (Oct., 1928) p. 538.
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cases where there are doubtful statements or contrary &ictabut
the result is on some ground or other in harmony with the Restatement; (.e) that small number of cases which are in direct
conflict with the Restatement, or whose rationale is based upon
deductions not warranted by the Restatement.
Section 75 declares in effect that consideration is the price
bargained for and paid for a promise. Our court has followed
the current form of statement and has declared that consideration consists of detriment to the promisee or benefit to the promisor, or both. The Restatement is somewhat better worked out
and easier of application in difficult cases, but the two reach the
same result that there may be a detriment to promisee but no
benefit to promisor as in Brady v. Equitable Trust C0.2; and it
may be very technical where only the giving up of a right is involved and such forbearance is in reality a benefit. In Kentucky
we have the almost traditional case of the grandmother promising
a reward to her grandson if for a given period he will refrain
from certain acts regarded by her as objectionable 3 Section 75
also declares that the consideration may move to the promisor
or to some third person, and it may be given by the promisee or
by some third person. Our cases are, with a possible exception,
in harmony with that view. 4
Section 75(1)-d declares that consideration for a promise
may be a return promise. This seems rather self-evident, yet
a case went to our Court of Appeals involving no more startling
doctrine than that.5 A contingent remainder passed to two children, R and S,the heirs apparent of A, as joint tenants. While
it was still contingent, R and S agreed among themselves to
convey each to the other a one-half interest in the remainder so
their interests would become separated. R performed his
promise and conveyed to S,but S failed to convey to R. S predeceased R before the remainder vested, and as a consequence
R obtained by survivorship what he should have acquired by
S's conveyance. 'Hebrought an action to set aside the convey2178 Ky. 693, 199 S. W. 1802 (1918); Cf. ternberg v. Bondurant,
223 Ky. 668 (1928).
3 Talbott v. Stemmons, 89 Ky. 222, 12 S. W. 297 (1889).
4West v. King, 163 Ky. 562 (1915); Mize. v. Barnes, 78 Ky. 506
(1880); Williamson v. Yager, 91 Ky. 282 (1891); Newton v. Carson, 80
Ky. 309 (1882). But Cf. Rasnick v. Bitter Lumber Co., infra note 50.
Weatherford v. Boulware, 102 Ky. 466 (1897).
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ance already made to S on the ground that there was no consideration for the agreement nor for the conveyance. It was
held that the promise of S was consideration for the promise of
R which had been performed.
It is in harmony with the Restatement's definition of consideration that a subscription made by the promisor along with
others is binding if -made for business reasons. For the moment
we are leaving to one side cases of charitable subscriptions. Thus
a promise to grant a right of way free to a corporation proposing
to build a railroad is based upon sufficient consideration where
the act stipulated for, viz., the building of the road, is performed.0
It is to be noted that the Restatement makes no mention of
past or executed consideration or moral consideration. It is supposed by the reporter that the succinct statement of what consideration is necessarily precludes these motives as valid consideration. They owe their appearance in our law largely to
Lord Mansfield, and, such vestiges of this doctrine as still appear
come under Section 85 where informal contracts without assent
or consideration are discussed. Thus, after a contract for purchase of land has been made and the land has been conveyed, a
promise to pay an additional sum for the land is not sustained
by any consideration.7 It was not part of the bargain. The
same may be said of a moral consideration. Thus a promise by
a putative father to support his bastard child is not valid,8 but
a promisor having paid a moral obligation, cannot recover the
money in assumpsit. 9
A promise to perform a preexisting duty is not a sufficient
consideration for a counter-promise. This seems to the writer
to be implied in Sections 76-a and 84-c rather than expressly
stated anywhere. In general, our decisions are in harmony with
a Curry v. Ky. WV. R. R. Co., 25 K. L. R. 1372, 78 S. 'W. 435 (1904).
"Howard v. Mceil, 25 K. L. R. 1394, 78 S. W. 142 (1904); Waltjers
v. Akers, 31 K. L. R. 259, 101 S. W. 1179 (1907); King v. Cassefl, 150 Ky.
537 (1912); CaldweN v. Felton, 21 Ky. L. R. 397, 51 S. W. 575 (1899);
Viey v. Pettit, 96 Ky. 576 (1895); Howard Shipyards & Dock Co. v.
Boone, 198 Ky. 829 (1923); Western Silo Company v. Jolnson, 203 Ky.
704 (1924); Spears v. Winkle, 186 Ky. 585 (1920); Greenup v. Wilhoite,
212 Ky. 465 (1926).
8

Mercer v. Mercer, 87 Ky. 20 (1888) ; Cf. Gay v. Botts, 13 Bush 299

(1877).

9Weihing v. Kurfes, 12 K. L. R. 893 (1891).
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this proposition. Thus a promise not to surrender a lease
during the term will not support a counter-promise. 10 This rule
prevails though the law has no means of enforcing the duty to
perform, and for that reason the counter-promisor is induced to
make his promise. Thus the law cannot compel a wife to nurse
her husband in time of his sickness, yet his promise to pay her
therefor as an inducement to nurse him, is without consideration.11
If the new promise differs, however, in any respect from the
old obligation, it is a sufficient consideration for a counterpromise as stated- in Section 81-c. So where a jailor furnishes
a better quality of food to a prisoner than the law requires, he
gives consideration for a promise by the prisoner to pay for the
additional benefit 1 2 to which he was not theretofore entitled.
Similarly, the present payment or promise to pay a part of
a debt -already due in consideration of a promise to release the
whole, does not support the latter promise, since there is a preexisting duty to pay the whole. Kentucky cases accord with this
proposition. 13 So also a mere promise to forbear bringing an
action on an obligation in return for a promise to do what the
obligor is already bound to do is without consideration. 1 4 But
if there is no clear duty to pay a fixed amount because the
amount due is not liquidated, a present payment or promise to
pay a named amount in consideration of an agreement to receive
such sum in full payment of the claim is supported by a sufficient consideration according to Section 76-a, and also according
to the Kentucky cases. 15 Kentucky also furnishes a case which
illustrates the proposition that if a claim is frivolously disputed
the situation is. not one of a disputed claim to be settled by negotiation. The promise to take less than the claim in such circumstances is without consideration.'"
10Proctorv. Keith, 12 B. Mon. 252 (1851); Cf. Ford v. Crenshaw, 1
Litt. 68 (1822) ; Marking v. Weedy, 8 Bush 22 (1871) ; Robinson v. Miller,
2 Bush 179 (1867); EbUin v. Miller, 78 Ky. 371 (1880).
umFoxworty v. Adams, 136 Ky. 403 (1910).
1 Trundle v. Riley, 17 B. Mon. 56 Ky. 396 (1856).
"New York Life Ins. Co. v. Van Meter, 137 Ky. 4, 121 S. W. 428
(1909).
',Aley v. Hopkins, 98 Ky. 668 (1896); Cf. also Tudor v. Security
Trust Co., 163 Ky. 514 (1915); Watt v. Parks, 78 S. W. 1125 (1904).
13Brady v. Equitable Trust Co., 178 Ky. 693, 199 S. W. 1802 (1918).
"Mils v. O'Daniel, 23 Ky. L. R. 73, 62 S. W. 1123 (1901).
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Section 76 declares any consideration that is not a promise
is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Section 19-c (requirement ,of consideration in contracts) except the following:
"An act or forbearance required by a legal duty that is
neither doubtful lior the subject of honest and reasonable dispute if the duty is owed either to the promisor or to the public,
or if imposed by the law of torts and crimes, is owed to any
person." In accord with this view Kentucky has held that a
promise to forbear is consideration for an act or counter-promise
only when the duty is a doubtful one. 2 But other cases seem
to admit of an interpretation more nearly in accord with the
Restatement, that if the duty is the subject of honest or reasonable dispute, forbearance or the promise to forbear is sufficient.' 8
Section 77 declares that except as qualified by other sections
of the Restatement, any promise, whether absolute or conditional,
is a sufficient consideration. So in Kentucky where an agent
agreed with the owner of a farm, which owner wished to sell the
farm, that such agent would sell it as a broker for a stated commission, and if the owner should buy another farm through this
same broker the fee would be refunded, the conditional promise
was held to be sufficient consideration.
Section 80 declares that a promise which is not binding is
generally insufficient consideration. This rule finds favor in
Kentucky in several cases where a married woman, prior to her
emancipation, had ,made invalid promises. A renewal of her
promise after emancipation is likewise not binding. 19 Of course
the reason for the invalidity of the second promise is the fact
that the consideration given for it was past or executed.
This section also provides that a promise which is neither
binding nor capable of becoming binding by acceptance of its
terms, is insufficient consideration, unless its invalidity is caused
by illegality due solely to facts which the promisor neithor knows
nor has reason to know. Kentucky furnishes good illustrations
of this doctrine, as, for example, the promise of a married woman
who was under a disability under our former statute to become
"ISupranote 16; Sellars v. Jones, 164 Ky. 458 (1915); Wager v.
Marks, 100 Ky. 541 (1897).
Is Ripy v. IAUard, 149 Ky. 726 (1912).
2Infra
note 2.
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surety for her husband 20 which our court declares is without
consideration. The promise of a maker of a note to pay a sum
of money in consideration of forbearance to prosecute an action
for seduction is similar.2 '
Section 82 declares that the recital of consideration is not
22
conclusive proof of the fact. So our court in Bourne v. Bourne
permitted the grantor to prove that in addition to the considerati6n named in the contract he was to have the rents and profits
of the land for that year.
It has been already suggested that Lord Mansfield introduced the doctrine of past and particularly of moral consideration into our law, deriving his inspiration from the civil law of
which he was a close student. Thus a guaranty of a married
woman which was totally void when made, having been acted
upon by the promisee, was allowed to be sufficient consideration
23
for her subsequent promise, when discoverd, to pay the same.
Of course moral consideration in the modern sense of consideration, as a bargain or agreed exchange, is a contradiefion in terms.
There is no such consideration. Nevertheless, vestiges of the
doctrine remain and they are not a few. The doctrine at common
law finally reached the important limitation that a past or moral
obligation should be sufficient to sustain a subsequent promise
only in cases where there had at some time been a binding obligation. The restatement, therefore, frankly puts aside the matter of consideration in certain types of contracts, and with certain qualifications which are enumerated in Sections 85-96,
declares that certain types of promises do not require consideration in order to be binding.
The heading of Section 86 declares that a promise to pay a
debt barred by the Statute of Limitations is binding without consideration. Such obligation does not include a promise to pay
a barred judgment debt. The section also prescribes the facts
which operate as such a promise, such as a voluntary acknowledgment, or the voluntary transfer of -money-or negotiable in20Ho loway v..Rudy, 22 K. L. R. 1406, 60 S. W. 650 (1901); Gilbert
v. Brown, 123 Ky. 703 (1906); Farmers Bank v. Williams, 205 Ky. 261
(1924).
21CZne v. Tempuleton, 78 Ky. 550 (1880).
92 Ky. 211, 17 S. W. 443 (1891). See also Poor v. Scott, 24 K. L.
R. 239, 68 S. W. 897 (1902).
"Lee v. Muggeridge, 5 Taunt. 36 (C. P. 1813).
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struments or other property, for the purpose of paying interest,
or as part payment on such an obligation. A promise to the obligee not to plead the Statute of Limitations as a defense is binding. Such a promise by a fiduciary does not bind the estate he
represents.
Our court has held that an acknowledgment of a debt so
discharged is insufficient (as a new promise) if there is a refusal
24
to pay or a statement of inability to pay made at the same time.
It also holds that the promise must be a clear acknowledgment
of the debt; hence a promise to leave a legacy to the creditor is
not sufficient because it might be intended as a gift and not as
payment of the debt. 25 But giving security 26 or partial payment is sufficient, but partial payment is not sufficient if there is
a disclaimer of further liability.27 If a debtor owes the same
creditor several debts and makes a general payment, the creditor
may apply the payment to any of the debts spve those discharged
by the Statute of Limitations. He must have specific authority
from the debtor in order to apply such payment to these and
start the Statute running all over again. 28 Our court agrees
with the Restatement 86 (1) (b) that part payment by a third
person, will not renew the obligation. 2 9 Our court holds that the
new period is the same as the old period and not necessarily the
ame as the period for an ordinary simple contract would be.80
On this precise point the Restatement seems to be silent in Section 87. Our court agrees with the Restatement that the promise
to pay such a discharged debt must be made to the person to
whom the money is due or to his assignee, surety or co-princi31
pal
Section 87 declares that a promise to pay all or part of a
debt of the promisor, discharged or dischargeable in bankruptcy
proceedings, begun before the promise is made, is binding. Our
2
court agrees with that proposition.
21Gray v. McDonag, 6 Bush 475 (69 Ky. 1869).

21 Schonbachlerv. Schonbachler, 22 K. L. R. 314, 57 S. W. 232 (1900).
21Maddox v. Walker, 25 K. L. R. 124, 78 S. W. 741 (1903).

2fRichardson v. Uhanslor, 103 Ky. 425 (1898); Marcum v. Ter'ry,
146 Ky.145 (1912).
8amuel v. Samuel, 151 Ky. 235 (1912).
30Galagherv. Whalen, 10 K. L. R. 458, 9 S. W. 390 (1888).
2*Baner v. York, 19 K. L. R. 643, 41 S. W. 309 (1897).
"Proctor v. Bill, 97 Ky. 98 (1895); Davis v. Strange, 156 Ky. 420
(1913).
"Brooks v. Paine, 25 K. L. R. 1125, 77 S. W. 190 (1903).
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Similar to discharge in bankruptcy proceedings and to discharge by the Statute of Limitations is the discharge of an indorser by failure to take the proper means to impbse liability
on him; and the discharge of a surety by extension of time to his
principal without his consent. If with full knowledge of his discharge he makes a new promise to pay, he is liable3 3 but if he
does not know the facts his promise does not bind3 4 him. In
5 one of the characters is famous in AmerLawrence v. RalstonU
ican history. Aaron Burr drew a bill at Frankfort on a New
York merchant. The drawee refused to accept and the indorsee
su d the payee-indoser on his subsequent promise to pay, the
latter having been discharged by failure to take the proper steps
to charge him. It was held that while a new promise by the discharged indorser is generally an implied admission of notice,
yet under the circumstances of that case he was not liable.
Again, if a promisor promises to pay when he becomes able
the condition of ability to pay must be established.3 6 The chief
difficulty with us in ease of discharge under the Statute of Limitations has been to answer the question whether suit should be
brought on the old or on the new promise. It has been held that
if the discharge is complete the action should be on the new
promise.3 7 If, however, the Statute had not completely run when
the new promise was made, the suit should not be on the new
promise,38 but rather on the old one. If the defendant should
then plead the Statute of Limitations, the replication would set
up the new promise and this would not be regarded by the court
as a departure. Yet, if the new promise was made only after the
action was brought, it could not be made use of in the replication
to defeat the plea. 89
2 rutcher
z
v. Trabu, 5 Dana 80 (35 Ky, 1837); Young v. New Farmers Bank, 102 Ky. 257 (1897); Higgins v. Morrison, 4 Dana 100 (34 Ky.
1836).4
Bank v. Smith, 9 B. Mon 609 (48 Ky. 1849); Landrum v. Trawbridge, 2 Met. 281, (59 Ky. 1859); Lawrence v. Ralston, 3 Bibb 102
(6 Ky. 1813).
"3 Bibb 102 (6 Ky. 1813).
31
Tole v. Smith, 98 Ky. 464 (1895); Brashears v. Combs, 174 Ky.
344 (1917).
Carson v. Osborne, 10 B. Mon. 155 (49 Ky. 1849); Gilmore v. Green,
14 Bush 772 (77 Ky. 1879); Rankin v. Anderson, 24 K. L. R. 647, 69 S.
W. 705 (1902).
39 Wurth v. Paducah, 116 Ky. 403 (1903).
'Best v. Givens, 3 B. Mon. 72 (42 Ky. 1842).
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The new promise of an adult made in consideration of a
former voidable promise by the same person while an infant, has
always been regarded as binding in Anglo-American law. It is
now seen that there is in fact no present consideration for the
new promise. Accordingly, the Restatement places such promises among a group of situationg where promises are binding
without consideration. The Restatement, Section 89 says:
"Except as stated in Section 93 a promise to perform all or a part
of an antecedent contract of the promisor theretofore voidable by him
but not avoided prior to the making of the promise is binding."
Under this section come, besides promises made by infants
who repeat the promises after reaching their majority, promises
made by persons who have been induced to contract by the fraud
of the promisee, and who, after discovery of the fraud, repeat
the promise. Our court says, following the older phraseology,
that there is consideration for the later promise. 40 Under our
Statute of Frauds41 which follows Lord Tenterden's Act,42 such
later promise or ratification must be in writing. Of course an
infant's ratification may be conditional or partial, but if
material obligations are involved, the infant cannot, by partial
ratification, bind the other to accept partial performance. 43 In
any event, the promise made by the adult to an infant is binding
on the former. 44
We have now discussed a number of cases dealing with consideration where our court agrees with the Restatement, although
in several of them the reasoning is not precisely the same as that
inferable from the Restatement.
There is a second group of cases, small in number, where
probably the result is sound but the reasoning is more or less
objectionable. For instance, in one case the court found there
was no contract because there was no consideration. Perhaps a
more satisfactory reason might be that there was no acceptance
of an offer. Of course, there must be acceptance of an offer as
well as consideration 45 in order that a contract may exist.
aWard v. Ward, 143 Ky. 9 (1911).

4'No. 470, par. 2, Carroll's Statutes (1922).
9 Geo. IV, Ch. 14, No. 15.
Lowry v. Drake, 1 Dana 46 (31 Ky. 1833).
"Cannon v. Alsburj, 8 Ky. 76 (1817).

"Citizens National Life Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 154 Ky. 88 (1913); Ker.
fmn v. Carter, 31 K. L. R. 865, 104 S. W. 308 (1907); Globe Fertilizer

Co. v. Tennessee Phosphate Co., 27 K. L. J. 636, 87 S. W. 1177 (1905).
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In DanieZ v. Daniel46 a son had purchased at execution sale
the land of his father for less than two-thirds of the appraised
value. He was informed by the father during the period of redemption that the latter had the money and meant to redeem.
The father erroneously believed that he would be obliged to go
to the courthouse in order to redeem. The son knew that this
was an erroneous idea but promised to take the father to the
courthouse for that purpose. He failed to carry out his promise
however and the period of redemption elapsed without the father
having taken the actual steps to redeem. The father brought an
action in equity to redeem. The court held that though there
was no consideration for the promise to take the father to the
county seat and that fraud cannot be predicated upon failure
to perform a promise or contract, yet the rule is relaxed in case
of great hardship. To this writer there seems to be no problem
of consideration or contract involved. This is simply a case
where the question is, can equity give relief ? The son took an
unconscientious advantage of the father's error and was in a
very real sense a fiduciary.
Many American courts, some for one reason and some for
another (there being about four current theories), hold charitable subscriptions binding. The result is in conflict with the
English view.

Our court has held 47 that such a subscription

promise is supported by the obligation of the trustees of the
charity to appropriate the funds subscribed according to the
provisions of the charter; as also by the liability incurred by
the charity from reliance on the promise of the subscriber. I,
however, consideration is the price bargained for and paid for
a promise, it seems clear that the subscriber was not bargaining
for such liability of the trustees. Anyone might rely on a promise to give a gift and incur liabilities thereby, and yet no bargain need have been made. Apparently realizing the strong tendency of American courts to hold charitable subscriptions
enforceable, the Restatement makes the following provision in
Section 90:
4

190 Ky. 210 (1921).

?Trustees v. Fleming, 10 Bush 234 (1874); Coller v. Baptist Ho.
ciety, 8 B. Mon. 68 (47 Ky. 1847). See the estoppel cases (which are
similar In principle and dealt with under the same section in the Re-

statement) Griffin v. Coffey, 9 B. Mon. 452 (1849); Martin v. Martin, 16
B. Mon.-8 (55 Ky. 1855).
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"A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part
of the promises and which does induce such action or forbearance, is
binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise."

This seems to be an adoption of the estoppel doctrine as declared
45
by Judge Cardozo.
It is clear that our decisions as they stand at present, go
much further than the Restatement, but it is not clear that there
would be any serious difficulty in limiting the doctrine here to
that of the Restatement as the facts of each case would probably
fit in with that declaration.
We have already found that our cases hold that the benefit
required by consideration might move to another than the
promisor and that detriment might move from another than the
promisee. 4 9 Let us look at the case Rasniek v. Ritter Lumber
Company.50 Both plaintiff and his stepdaughter had begun
suits against the physician employed by defendant company for
slander. The wife of plaintiff also had begun an action against
the same physician for alleged failure to perform professional
services which he was under a duty to perform. It was alleged
by plaintiff that defendant company represented to him that
these suits were causing defendant some embarrassment. It
therefore offered plaintiff in consideration that if he would have
all these suits dismissed, it would give him employment at a fixed
wage per day so long as it had work to be performed in the
manufacture of lumber at its plant. Plaintiff alleged that he
accepted this offer and had the suits dismissed, but that defendant refused so to employ the plaintiff. A demurrer to the petition was sustained. Mr. Justice Thomas held that there was no
consideration for the promise to employ the plaintiff inasmuch
as the defendant had no interest in the suits brought against
the physician since it was not remotely liable for the claim. This
seems to mean that consideration must move from the promisee.
43

Allegheny College v. Bank, 159 N. E. 173 (N. Y. 1927). See 27
Mich. L. Rev. 88 (1928). The four different grounds for finding
sufficient consideration in charitable subscriptions have been (a)
the liability incurred on the faith of the subscription (see Collier v.
Baptist Society, supra n. 46); (b) the promise of each subscriber is
supported by the promises of the others; (c) such promise is supported
by the obligation to apply the funds properly, Trustees v. Fleming,
supra n. 46; (d) the fact that the promise of the subscriber has Induced.
others to subscribe.

10See supranote 4.

"187 Ky. 523 (1920).
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HTere again, however, the result might be sustained for a different reason also mentioned by the same Justice, that a promise
made in consideration of the dismissal of -a claim not prosecuted
in good faith is not sustained by sufficient consideration. 51 The
chief difficulty with this reason is that so far as this writer
knows, an allegation of good faith need not be affirmatively made
in the petition, and it could not be shown on demurrer that the
actions had not been brought in good faith.
Again, the Restatement declares in Section 81, with certain
qualifications not affecting our problem here, that:
"Gain or advantage to the promisor or loss or disadvantage to the
promisee, or the relative values of a promise and the consideration for
it, do not affect the sufficiency of consideration,"
It has been shown that our cases are in general in agreement with this statement.6 2 There are a few cases, however,
which seem to conflict with that view. In one case an option was
granted for the coal under defendant's land. The price for the
option was one dollar. The court held there was no consideration for the promise to give an option. 3 If the one dollar was
neither paid nor expected to be paid, undoubtedly the mere recital of payment would not make the promise valid, 4 but it is
not clear that the dollar was not paid nor not expected to be
paid. In another case certain phosphate lands were leased and
lessee was to pay as rental five dollars per year whether the land
was mined or not mined. It was held that there was no consideration for the promise to lease. 55
It would seem a priorithat a subsequent gratuitous promise
by a surety to pay a claim from which he had been discharged
would be like promises made by one discharged in bankruptcy
proceedings or by an indorser discharged by failure of the holder
to give proper notice. It seems clear that Section 86 (1) of the
Restatement covers the case of a discharged surety and makes
his promise binding, but our court has taken an unusual view,
and has held such new promise not to be binding.56
See Restatement, Section 76 (b).
See cases in note 2, supra.

Thomson d Company v. Reid, 31 K. L. R. 176, 101 S. W. 964 (1907).
"See Restatement, Section 82.
IKillebrew v. Murray, 151 Ky. 176, 101 S. W. 964 (1912).
'Triplett v. Commonwealth, 9 B. Mon. 438 (48 Ky. 1849) ; Emmonw
v. Overton, 18 B. Mon. 643 (57 Ky. 1857) ; Fechheimer v. Gol~namer, 169
Ky. 243 (1916); Rafferty v. Bank, 176 Ky. 145 (1917).
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Our court also has held that a new promise by a personal
representative may revive a debt of the deceased barred by the
Statute of Limitations.57 The Restatement Section 86 (3) declares:
"An executor, administrator, trustee or guardian who makes such a
promise as that stated in subsection (1) cannot by so doing impose a
duty upon the estate which he respresents. Nor will he be personally
bound unless he was bound by the antecedent duty."

In another case a bankrupt filed a petition in bankruptcy
in August, 1868. He was discharged in August, 1871. He made
a new promise to pay the old debt in November, 1870. The court
held that at the time the new promise was made the old obligation was still an existing and valid one; that the old obligation
was not discharged by giving the new promise because a promise
to do what one is already under a legal obligation to do is not
supported by consideration. 58 There is no doubt but that this
h6lding is contrary to the great weight of American authority. 5 9
The Restatement, as above noted, says that a promise to pay all
or part of a debt of the promisor discharged or dischargeablein
bankruptcy proceedings begun before the promise is made, is
binding.
Again Section 86 (c) of the Restatement declares that a
promise to the obligee not to pleail the Statute of Limitations
as a defense to an action is binding. Presumably the rule applies whether such promise is made at the time the principal
obligation is incurred or subsequently, though the illustration
used in the Restatement is one where the promise was subsequently made. In Moxley v. Ragan6O the promise was made at
the time the original obligation was incurred. Our court held
such a promise to be contrary to good policy and void.
Perhaps the most conspicuous case where our court differs
from the Restatement is McDevitt v. Stokes.61 It will be recalled
that plaintiff was a jockey in the employ of one Shaw and was
to ride the mare "Grace" in the Futurity Race of the Kentucky
"Thomas v. Daniel, 7 K. L. R. 98 (1885); Northcutt v. Wilkinson,

12 B. Mon. 408 (1851).
0 Ogden v. Redd, 13 Bush 581 (76 Ky. 1877); Graves v. McGuire, 79
Ky. 532 (-).
'Williston

on Contracts, Section 158 (1920).

"10 Bush 156 (73 Ky. 1873).
"174 Ky. 515 (1917), L. R. A. 1917D 1100; Cf. 16 Kentucky Law
Journal 306 (1928).
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Trotting Horse Breeders Association of Lexington in October,
1910. The defendant Stokes owned the sire, the dam, and two
brothers of "Grace" and it was a matter of great importance to
Stokes both financially and otherwise that "Grace" should win.
He accordingly promised plaintiff that he would pay plaintiff
the sum of one thousand dollars if the latter should win the race
Plaintiff did win but defendant refused to pay.
with "Grace."
Plaintiff brought an action on the promise, and a general demurrer was sustained by the trial court on the ground that
McDevitt was already under an obligation to Shaw to ride
"Grace" and win if he could, and that his act was no consideration for the promise of Stokes to pay him one thousand dollars.
This position of the trial court was sustained by the Coirt of
Appeals. Of course it is everywhere agreed that such a promise
made by Shaw would not' be binding, but this promise was made
by a third person who was actively interested in the performance of the act by plaintiff. The Restatement, in Section 84c,
says that consideration is not insufficient because the party
giving the consideration is then bound by a contractualor quasicontractualduty to a third person to perform the act or forbearance given or promised as consideration.
To sum up, so far as consideration as an element in contracts is concerned, our case law agrees very closely in the great
majority of cases with the Restatement. A few cases reach
sound results though we might not all agree upon the grounds
for reaching those results.
Our court seems rather definitely to disagree with the
Restatement (a) as to the liability on a gratuitous subsequent
promise by a surety; (b) as to a similar promise made by an
executor; (c) as to the later promise made by a bankrupt after
petition in bankruptcy proceedings has been filed but before discharge; (d) as to the validity of a promise not to plead the
Statute of Limitations; and (e) as to the validity of a promise
made by a promisor in consideration of the performance of a
duty already owed to a third person by the promisor in which
performance the promisor has an important financial interest.
Our court has gone on record as holding that benefit need
not proceed to the promisor nor need the detriment proceed from
the promisee; yet a recent case throws some doubt upon its
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present position on that matter. Our court has also held generally that the adequacy of consideration is immaterial, yet in
one or two cases a rather unqualified statement has been made
that one dollar paid or promised to be paid in consideration of
a promise would not support such promise. Our court has
also gone farther on the face of the situation in sustaining charitable subscriptions than the Restatement, but not too far to be
embarrassing if it should see fit in the future to accept the doctrine of the Restatement.
ALvn E. EvANs
Law School, University of Kentucky.

